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paper.ABSTRACT
During the 1960s, the elimination of employment discrimination
became a major social goal. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was designed to implement that goal. The purpose of this paper is to
estimate the effects of enforcement of Title V1I to determine whether
and to what extent it has helped to achieve this social goal.
The mode~ developed in this paper departs from those of previous
Title VII studies in two ways. First, it incorporates the effects of
the law's enforcement on nonrespondent covered firms in addition to the
effects on respondent firms. Second, it analyzes separately the effects
of enforcement of the law's employment and wage provisions.
Empirical testing of the model focuses on the variations across
states in the relative employment of black males in covered firms and in
the economy, and on the relative wages of nonwhite males in the economy.
OLS and TSLS regression techniques are used to estimate the effects on
these measures of overall enforcement and of enforcement of the employ-
llient and wage provisions of the law. The incidence of enforcement is
measured by the number of discrimination charges filed by minorities
divided by the number of employees in covered firms. The primary data
sources area matched sample of covered firms, 1966-1970, and the U.S.
Censuses.
The evidence suggests that in the aggregate, from its inception
through fiscal year 1970, enforcement of Title VII at best left the
economic position of black males unchanged and at worst caused it to
deteriorate. While enforcement of the employment provision increased
relative employment in covered firms and relative employment and wages in
the economy, enforcement of the wage provision had precisely the opposite
.effects. The latter effects appear to have dominated the former, although
the net negative impact is, in general, statistically insignificant.THE ECONOMICS OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Introduction
During the 1960s, the elimination of employment discrimination
became a major social goal. Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) laws
were designed to accomplish this goal; the primary policy tool for
carrying it out has been the enforcement of these laws. Perhaps the most
important among EEO laws, and certainly the one with the broadest coverage,
is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Economists have directed
their efforts towards examining the impact of these and other laws
because (1) their actual effects may differ from the intended ones and
(2) it is important in making policy decisions to estimate the magnitude
of the effects that actually occur. The purpose of this paper is to
estimate the actual effects of enforcement of Title VII to determine whether
and to what extent it has helped to achieve this social goal.
Earlier studies of other EEO legislation include analyses of the
impact on the minority economic position of state fair-employment. laws
and of federal contract compliance. Using nationwide samples, it has
been found that the relative wages of nonwhite males increased more in
states with fair-employment laws than in states without them (Landes, 1968);
and that the employment of black relative to white males increased more
in firms that held federal contracts than in firms that did not (Ashenfelter
and Heckman, 1974). To date, there has been no comparable nationwide
,
study of the impact of Title VII.
Past studies of Title VII used limited samples. They examined the
effects of the law's enforcement on relative minority employment2
patterns in firms (Adams, 1973) or unions (Wolkinson, 1973) that had been
charged with discrimination ("respondent" firms or unions), or in
firms in a specific industry in a given geographical area that had
been investigated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)l
(Kidder, 1972). In general, these studies indicated that the law had a
small or negligible impact on relative minority employment. However, the
researchers failed to take into account the effect of enforcement on the
employment practices of nonrespondent covered fiL~a (thereby biasing
their estimates) and did not consider separately the effects 0f'the~aw's
various provisions. In this paper, the indirect or demonstration effects
of enforcement on respondents and nonrespondents are captured in a model
that aggregates over both types of firms by geographical area. The
model specifies the demonstration effect as a function of the incidence
of enforcement in an area: descriptively, an indicator of the law's
relative presence, and technically, an approximation of the probability
of apprehension for violation of the law. In addition, in this paper the
effects of enforcement of the law's employment and wage provisions are
analyzed separately; it ia shown; that they may have opposing e~~ect8 on
the relative economic position of minorities.
The model is developed in section I. In sections II and III, it
is used to test the impact of Title VII's enforcement through fiscal
year 1970 on the relative employment of black males in the covered sector
(that is, covered by the law) and in the economy, and through fiscal year
1969 on the relative wages of nonwhite males in the economy. The
equations estimated are adapted from the Ashenfelter-Heckman and Landes
studies. The results suggest that, on the average, during the early years
j;.b.e actual effects ;ollkt1l.e,T;ltle 'ill:' $. '~fOl;~E?l!l~t .l;1i£f/?l<e..d frQijI, the ,~t;,~nded
ones. Moreover, they support the model's predictions of opposing3
effects of enforcement of the employment and wage provisions. A summary,
conclusions, and some policy implications of the study are presented
in secU,on IV.
I. Theoretical Analysis
The theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of enforcement
of Title VII on relative black empl~yment and wages encompasses two questions:
(1) How will the firm and industry respond to enforcement of Title VII,
2
and what implications does this behavior have for changes in relative black
. 3
.employment and wages in the covered sector and in the economy as a whole?
(2) ·How do the enforcement activities of the EEOC affect firms '. decisions
on whether and to what extent to comply with the law?
Answering the first question entails an analysis of the actual costs
to the firm of various types of compliance. Answering the second requires
a model in which firms estimate the expected costs of violation based
. . . 4
upon their observations of EEOC enforcement activities in their area.
A. Employment and Wage Effects of Enforcement of Title VII
The majority of complaints filed under Title VII come under two
provisions: the employment provision, which covers hiring, firing, discharge,
and recall; and the wage provision, which covers compensation, promotion,
demotion, and seniority.5 The employment provision is designed to eliminate
restrictions on the mobility of black workers into firms and occupations.
The wage· provision specifies that equally productive workers in a firm
must receive the same wage, regardless of race. The effects on the
competitive firm and industry of compliance with each provision are
discussed in turn.4
1. Enforcement of the emplo~ent provision. Compliance with the
employment provision requires that a firm hire "qualified" blacks who
seek employment at all occupational levels. If blacks and whites
supplied themselves at random to firms in a given area, then compliance
with this provision would occur when the black-to-white employment ratio
in each occupation in a firm equaled the ratio of qualified blacks to
qualified whites in the labor force of the area. In other words,
compliance implies a work rule that specifies a fixed proportion of black
6 7 workers to white workers, although that proportion may vary by occupation. '
Covered firms with initial black-to-whiteemployment ratios below the
. fixed-proportion rule increase their demand for black workers relative
to white workers. This may be shown simply in a model in which blacks and
whites are perfect substitutes in production and in which black and white
8
wages are given to the firm. It has been "Shown that where blacks and
whites are treated as perfect substitutes, discrimination results in
9 segregated firms or segregated occupations within firms. In a given firm,
occupations may be segregated black, segregated white, or integrated.
Strictly speaking, enforcement of the employment provision affects only
the latter two.
Assume that the firm has a production function with two types of
(1.1)
The firm produces both types of labor services with black labor, B, and
white labor, W, which are perfect substitutes. nence, Ll = Bl + W l and
* * LZ
= B2 + W Z' In panels I and II of Figure 1, ABl and W 2D are isoquants
for the production of the two types of services respectively. For type Ll
services, the firm faces a net wage ratio equal to (w1B + dlB)/wlW
and for type LZ' (w2B + dZB)/wZW' where dlB and dZB are the monetary5
equivalents of the firm's tastes for discri.'Uination against Bl. and BZ
* * respectively. CBl and WZE in panels I and II are the least-cost lines
10 given by these net wage ratios. At the initial equilibrium, M, .shown
* * in panel III, the firm hires Bl in L
l
, W z in L2, a~d the net ,~ge ratio
for the production function is equal to (wlB + dlB)/wZW' sho~m. by the
slope of FG.
Enforcement of the employment provision affects the LZ labor service.
If the fixed-proportion work rule is given by the slope of the ray OR
from the origin as in panel II, the equilibrium point shifts from a
corner on the W z axis to a point such as J on the ray OH. The net wage
of LZ labor becomes a weighted average of the net black wage and the white
wage in LZ; the weights are the proportions of L2 jobs held by blacks
and by whites. The net wage ratio for the production function equals
h
,
(wZB + d2B) +
1>1Z
(wlB + dlB) -, wzw
. LZ LZ L
it has been assumed that (wZB + dZB) > w ZW• Hence, LZ labor becomes
relatively more costly; the slope of the least.,.cost line in panel III is
reduced, and the firm substitutes Ll for LZ' as shown by the new equilibrium
11
point N. This substitution towards the segregated black occupation
implies that the covered firm that chooses to comply with the law increases
its employmerttof blacks by even more than is required to attain the
specified B/W ratio in the segregated white occupation.
This analysis is easily extended to cover the case in which both
occupations are segregated white. Where occupations are integrated, the
firm will hire at least the specified ratio of black workers to white
workers and no other changes will occur.Fi gure 17
The implication of this analysis is that a ;Eirrq. that chooses to
comply with the employment provision increases its demand for black workers
relative to white workers. In order to determine whether black employment
increases or decreases and what happens to white and total employment,
it is necessary to specify the firm's underlying utility functiop. One
commonly used specification makes utility a function of profits (Tr) and
the number of blacks employed (B):
u = U (Tr, B) with u
l
> 0 and Uz
< 0 (1. z)
and (1. 3)
where P is the price of output and f is the production function with
o
II
f' > 0 and f < O. It is shown in Appendix A that a government~enforced
employment ratio causes the· firm to (1) increase the number of blacks
employed, (2) decrease the number of whites employed, and (3) decrease
the total employment of the firm.
According to this model, industry supply will decline and product
price will rise. Unless the demand for the industry's output is perfectly
inelastic, the scale of the industry is reduced. If many firms in the
covered sector have similar utility functions, an excess supply of
white labor is created in that sector,which cannot be absorbed due to
the scale reduction. Unemployed whites move into the uncovered
sectqr, increasing the relative supply of whites and the b1ack-to-white
wage ratio in that sector.
While it is unclear what reduction in utility will caw,;e a firm to
go out of business, it is obvious that it can regain a higher level o[
utility by moving into an area where blacks are a 9maller p~oportion of
the labor force, assuming for the moment that moving is c~st1ess. Should
enforcement occur in such an area, the firm's utility will be reduced8
by a smaller amount; the government-enforced proportion will be at a
lower B/W ratio at the new location than it was at the initial
location. The movement of firms into areas with lower black populations
reduces the covered-sector demand for blacks and for blacks relative to
whites, provided that blacks are relatively less mobile than firms.12
If the increase in relative demand in firms that stay iil: business at
the same location exceeds the reduction brought abo~t by the relocation of
firms, then enforcement of the employment provision will increase the
relative employment and wages 6f blacks in the covered sector and in the
economy as a whole. Alternatively, if the reduction in relative demand
exceeds the increase, relative employment and wages will falLl3
In summary, enforcement of the employment provision of Title VII
will have a positive effect upon relative black employment in covered
firms that remain in business at the same location, and a positive or
negative effect upon relative black employment and wages overall.
2. Enforcement·of the wage provision. ·Compliance with the wage
provision requires the firm that hires both blacks and whites to pay
them equal wages for the same work and give them equal opportunities for
promotion to higher-paying jobs. If blacks are paid less than whites,
then enforcement requires the firm to increase wB' which raises relative
wages.
For the case in which blacks and whites are treated as perfect
substitutes in production,l4 it is only the integrated firm that is
affected by enforcement of the wage provision. An increase in wB/wW
causes such a firm to move to a corner on the Waxis, as in the initial
position shown in panel II of Figure 1; ignoring hiring costs, the firm
becomes segregated white. The quantity of black workers relative to'/'
9
white workers demanded is reduced, and relative black employment falls
'(in this case to zero).
The long-run supply price 6f the perfectly competitive industry
must increase and its output must be reduced when the price of a factor
increases. The reduction in industry output may be accomplished by a
reduction in the output of the individual firm or by the exit of firms
from the industry.IS The reduction in the size of the covered sector
,leads to a decrease in the demand for all facto:t;"s of production and
to excess supply in that sector. As blacks and whites move into
" '
,the uncoveredsec.tor; their wages will fall absolutely, but the
relative wage in that sector may rise or fall.16 The effect of enforcement"
of the wage provision on the average relative wage in the covered sector
is also ambiguous. Firms can reduce the costs of coro.pliance by moving
into areas in which there are fewer blacks in the'labor force. The
resulting reduction in the demand for blacks relative to whites in the
covered sector puts a downward pressure on relative wages. On the other
hand, relative wages are increased in those covered firms that comply with
the wage provision.
Some of the blacks who become, unemployed in the covered sector may
search for the higher-wage jobs in that sector r~ther than accept
employment in the uncovered sector. In addition, if the expected wage
(the actual wage times the probability of having a job) in the covered
sector is greater than the wage in the uncovered sector, blacks employed
in the uncovered sector ,will move to the covered sector to search for
these jobs.17 The incentive for blacks to increase the time spent in
job search will reduce relative black employment in the economy as a
whol.e.10
In summary, enforcement of the wage provision will increase relative
wages in those covered firms that comply with the provision, while it
may reduce or increase them in the covered sector as a whole and in the
uncovered sector. Therefore, the average wage effect for the entire
economy may be positive or negative. The average employment effect of
enforcement of the wage provision will tend to be negative. There are
two factors working in this direction--the reduction in relative employment
in the covered sector and the tendency for blacks to increase the time
spent in job search.
Whether and in what way a firm chooses to comply with the law will
depend on the firm's perceptions of the relative probabilities of being
apprehended for violating each provision. The formation of these
perceptions and the mechanism by which they influence behavior will be
discussed in the next section.
B. The Direct and Indirect Effects of Enforcement
This analysis departs from previous studies of Title VII in its
attempt to incorporate both the direct and the indirect or demonstration
effects of enforcement of Title VII on firms in the covered sector. The
direct effects of the law are changes in the employment practices of
firms that result from specific charges of discrimination. The demonstration
effects are modifications in the employment practices of covered firms
including nonrespondents, which, aware of enforcement activities, seek to
avoid being charged with discrimination.18
All firms that engage in discriminatory employment practices face
a set of costs, the e~pected costs of violation of Title VII. These
costs are a function of the actual costs of violating the law if the11
firm is caught times the probability of being caught.
19
The probability
of apprehension, p, depends upon the level and type of violations in
which the firm engages, and can be affected by changes in i,ts employment
practices. Although these piS are unknown a priori, the individual firm
can use information available to it to estimate them.
It is assumed that the firm has knowledge of the incidence of proximate
firms that are caught in the different violations, that is, firms against
which enforcement takes place.20 Then, the firm's perceived probability
of apprehension for each type of violation may be specified as a positive
function of the incidence of proximate firms that are caught with similar
violations. Given the monetary value to the firm of discrimination, the
firm's risk preferences, the actual costs of compliance, and the actual
costs associated with each level of violation, the higher the firm's
perceived probability of apprehension, the higher the expected costs
of violation, and the g;reate.l;' the likelihood that the fi~m will seek to
. . 21
comply with the provisions of the law.
The aggregate behavioral res~onse to enforcement depends upon three
factors: (1) the expected cost functions of all firms, (2) the incidence
of firms that are caught~, and (3) the number of firms aware of any given
enforcement activity. The perceived probability of apprehension, and
therefore (1), was specified as a positive function of (2) for each firm.
Further, (3) is postulated to be a positive function of (2), that is, the
number of firms aware of any given enforcement activity is postulated to
increase with increases in the incidence of enforcement.
The total enforcement effect on relative employment or relative wages
is the sum of the direct enforcement effects (the behavioral responses of
firms that are caught), and the demonstration effects (the behavioral12
responses of those firms that are aware of enforcement activities). From
the reasoning in the previous section, the direct and demonstration effects
may be positive or negative.
The change in the total enforcement effect resulting from an
increase in the incidence of enforcement is equal to the average enforce-
ment effect in respondent firms plus (the number ·of firms affected
indirectly times the change in the indirect enforcement effect due to
an increase in the perceived probability of apprehension) plus (the
average indirect enforcement effect times the increase in the number of
firms affected indirectly due to the increase in enforcement). (It
shouJ.d be noted that the average direct enforcement effect is unobserv-
able because respondent firms may also be affected indirectly.)22
An implication of this a~alysis is that if the direct and demonstra-
tion effects of enforcement have the same sign, the total enforcement
effect on relative employment or wages will increase (or decrease) with
increases in the incidence of enforcement. This hypothesis will be
tested in a cross-sectional analysis in which proximity is defined
23
geographically by state.
II. Empirical Analysis: Relative Employment
The effect of enforcement of Title VII on the employment of black
relative to white males may be estimated for covered firms and for the
economy as a whole. Matched 1966 and 1970 employment records of a
sample of covered firms that were in business at the same location in
both years, aggregated by state, are used to estimate the enforcement
effects on covered firms. The matched sample is well suited for this",
13
purpose because it allows a test of one of the two unambiguous predictions
of the theoretical model: the positive effect of enforcement of the
employment provision on relative employment in firms that did not move.
(The unavailability of data precludes estimation of the other unambiguous
prediction of the model; the positive effect of enforcement of the wage
. 24 provision on relative wages in these f1rms.) The effects on relative
employment in each of the nine broad census occupational categories and
25
on total relative employment are estimated. Census data for 1950,
1960, and 1970 are used to estimate enforcement effects on total relative
employment in the economy as a whole. The mobility effects of 'enforce-
ment on covered firms are captured in this phase of the empirical analysis.
The estimating equation is formulated to incorporate the idea that
the attempt to bring the actual level of relative black employment to
26 its desired level is only partially successful in anyone period. The
adjustment process may be written as
(
RBEt ) = (RBE: ),A
, RBEt _l RBEt _l
(2.1) ,
where RBE is the level of relative black employment, by occupation and
* total, in time periods t and t-l, RBE , is the long-run level of RBE, and
A is the adjustment coefficient. This process may be rewritten as
* lnRBE - lnRBE = A1nRBEt - AlnRBE l'
t t-l t- (2.2)
The natural logarithm of the long-run target level may be expressed as
* ' . 2
lnRBE =a + SInK + ylnCHG + 8(lnCHG)
t ' .
(2.3)
where X is a common set of variables assumed to determine all employment
ratios and CHG is a measure of the incidence of enforcement. In
determining their target employment ratios, 'firms are assumed to take the14
costs of violation of Title VII into consideration. The quadratic
* formulation implies that the elasticity of RBE with respect to CRG
depends on the level of CRG. Using (2.3), (2.2) may be rewritten as
2 1nRBEt - 1nRBEt _1 = A~ + A61nX + Ay1nCRG + Ao(lnCRG) - A1nRBEt _l + ut (2.4)
where ut is a disturbance term with the classical properties. The
2
coefficients of lnCRG and (lnCRG) provide an estimate of the short-run
adjustment elasticity of relative employment with respect to enforcement.
Finally, the equations are estimated using the following equivalent
formulation:
1nRBE = A~ + ASlnX + Ay1nCHG + Ao(lnCHG)2 + (l-A)lnRBE + ut '
t· t-l
(2.5)
The X vector includes such economic and demographic factors as the
level of and change in the relative supply of blacks, the level of and
change in total employment in each state, the relative educational level
of black males, labor market variables, and location in an SMSA or in
the South. It also includes variables representing other equal em-
p10yment opportunity laws in effect during the period: federal contract
compliance and state fair-employment laws. Executive Order 11246
prohibits discrimination in employment by federal contractors; state
fair-employment laws make employment discrimination illegal in some
states. These laws are expected to increase the demand for black relative
to white males and therefore to have a positive effect on relative
black employment.
In the theoretical analysis of the previous section, the effect of
enforcement was hypothesized to be a function of the incidence of en-
forcement. The empirical counterpart used in this paper is the number
of discrimination charges (C) filed with and accepted as under their15
jurisdiction by the EEOC27 , 28 divided by the number of employees in
29 30 covered firms (N).' The mean and standard deviation of Care 454.4
and 596.9; those of C/N are .00064 and .00080. The measure C/N is
equal to the actual probability of apprehension times the incidence of
discrimination: C/N = c/D X D/~, where D is a measure of the number of
violators of the law. Since there exists no independent measure of D,
C/N is used as·an estimate of the incidence of enforcement; the relative
variation in C/N will approximate the relative variation in c/D to
the extent tha~ systematic variations across states in the incidence of
discrimination are controlled for. Part of the variation across states
in the incidence is reflected in the traditional demographic factors
included in the X vector of equation (2.5). In addition, the initial level
of relative black employment (RBEt _l ) reflects cumulative market
phenomena including discrimination; it is assumed that the variation
across states in the incidence of discrimination is approximated by the
variation in RBE .31
t-l
A value for each of the variables is assigned to each state. The
variables are defined and their sources stated i~ Table 1.32
A. The Effect of Enforcement on Covered Employment
Tables 2 and 3 present ordinary least squares (018) estimates
of the coefficients on enforcement variables from log-linear weighted
33 regression equations . on the change in relative black male employment
in covered firms between 1966 and 1970, total and by occupation.
(Because of the possibility of simultaniety between the dependent
variable, the change in the economic position of black males, and
theenforceme~tvariables,. a simultaneous equations model, in which
enforcement is treated as endogenous, was .also estimated. The16
two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimates, which do not differ signifi-
cantly from the OLS estimates presented below, can be found in
Beller, 1974, appendix B. 34) Table 2 contains coefficients on the
overall incidence of enforcement of Title VII; Table 3, on the incidence
of enforcement 6f the employment and wage provisions. These coeffi-
cients are estimates of the short-run adjustment elasticities of
relative employment with respect to the incidence of enforcement. (The
complete equation for total relative e~ployment is presented with dis-
cussion in Appendix B. Space limitations preclude presentation of the
equations for each occupation; the interested reader is referred to
Beller, 1974, pp. 91-95 and 123-137.).
The incidence of enforcement is specified in linear and quadratic
forms; the appropriate form is not made explicit by the theoretical
analysis. Lines 1 and 2 of Table 2 contain the coefficients and
t-statistics on the overall incidence of enforcement with both a linear
and a quadratic term entered in each occupational equation. Lines ~
35 and 4 present the number of degrees of freedom for these equations
and the F-test for joint significance. Lines 5 and 6 contain the co-
efficients and t-statistics on a linear or a quadratic term entered
alone; the coefficient is presented only if it is as significant as or
more significant than the comparable coefficient from the joint
specification. In Table 3, lines 1 and 2 contain linear and/or quadratic
terms on the incidence of enforcement of the employment provision, and
lines 3 aud 4 contain linear and/or quadratic terms on the incidence of
enforcement of the wage provision. The specification presented for each
occupation--including at least one employment provision variable aud
one wage provision variable--is that for which the joint significance
36 level, indicated by the F-statistic (lines 5 and 6), is highest.Variable
Name
RBE70, RBE66
& RBETL
EMPL
CEMPL
PPB
CPPB
GMR
RED
UNEMPL
CUNEMPL
PFC
CHG1, EMCHGl,
and WACHG1
17
TABLE 1
List, of Variables Used in Employment Analysis
Definition
The ratio of black to white male employment in each occupa-
tion in 1970 and 1966 in the covered sector and the ratio
of black to white male total employment in 1970 and 1960 in
the entire state. The occupations are officials and mana-
gers, professionals, technical, sales, office and clerical,
craftsmen, operatives, laborers, serviceworker~and total.
Total employment in 1970 in (1) the covered sector or (2)
the entire state.
Change in EMPL in (1) the covered sector between 1966 and
1970 or (2) the entire state between 1960 and 1970.
Proportion of the population that is black in 1970. Data
are from the 1970 Census.
Change in PPB between 1960 and 1970. Data are from the
1960 and 1970 Censuses.
'Gross migration rate of blacks between 1965 and 1970. Data,
are from the 1970 Census.
The ratio of the mean years of school completed of black to
white m.a1es, 25 and over, in 1970.' Included in the equaUGlns
for the whtte-co11ar occupations only. Data are from the 1970
Census. '
Unemployment rate of all males, 16 and over, in 1970. Data
are from the 1970 Census.
Change in the annual average unemployment rate between (1)
1965 and 1969 or (2) 1960 and 1969. Data'are from the Man-
power Report of the President 1973.
Proportion of employment in the matched sample in firms
with federal contracts.
The total number of charges of discrimination filed by
minority males and females during fiscal years 1968-1970
divided by the number of employees in firms with 20 or more
employees in 1969. The' prefix EM is used to represent
charges which include' violation of the employment provision
as,an issue and WA, violation of the wage provision. The
total number of issues is greater than the total number of
charges because a charge is often filed for more than one18
TABLE l--Continued
Variable
Name Definition
CHGI (continued) issue. Charges data are from the Division of Systems and
Control of the EEOC and data on the number of employees are
from County Business Patterns 1969, part 1•
.FEPC64 Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states with Fair
Employment Practices commissions established prior to 1964
and zero elsewhere.
UNION Union membership as a proportion of total employment in
nonagricultural establishments in 1970. Data are from the
Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations
1971.
SMSA Proportion of employment in an SMSA in (1) the covered
sector or (2) the entire state.
SOUTH Dummy variable assigned a value of one for all southern
states and zero for nonsouthern states.
MFG Proportion of employment in manufacturing firms in (1) the
covered sector or (2) the entire state.
PEMCOV The number of employees in Social Security reporting units
with 20 or more employees divided by the total number of
employees in all reporting units. This variable is in-
cluded in the regressions for the entire economy only and
is used as a proxy for-the prQPort1on of emp1oyment,t~·the
covered sector. Data are from County Business Patterns,
1969, part 1.
Note: Unless otherwise stated, data for the covered-sector regressions
are taken from the matched sample tapes and data for the entire economy
regressions are taken from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses.19
TABLE 2
Coefficients and Significance of Incidence of Enforcement Variables
from Log-Linear Regression Equations on the Change in Relative
.Black En~loyment from'l966-l970 by Occupation and Total
for Covered Firms in the United States
Occupation
1. •• lnCHGl
2••• lnCHG12
3••• Degrees of
freedom
Officials
and
Managers
.3694
(1.18)
.0196
(1.04)
22
Professional
.0028
(0.01)
.0088
(0.41)
26
Technical
.0250
(0.09)
.0038
(0.23)
25
Sales
-.0563
(0.10)
-.0122
(0.38)
23
Office
and
Clerical
.2804
(0.91)
.0210
(1.15)
26
4••• F-test F(2,22)=1.38F(2,26)=5.09** F(2,25)=0.54 F(2,25)=2.95* F(2,26)=2.29
5••• lnCH,?l
or
6••• lnCHG12
1.•• lnCHGl
2••• lnCHG12
til ,I.
:0470
(1.34)
Craftsmen
.5070
(1.41)
.0299'
(1.37)
-.1442
(3.27)***
Operatives
.3528
(1.39)
.0213
. (1.41)
-.0377
(1.13)
Laborers
.•1410
(0.65)
.0081
(0~63)
.1446
(2.47)**
Service
Workers
-.0803
(0.29)
-.0058
(0.35)
-.0701
(1.78)*
Total
.3274
(2.05)**
.0205
(2.16)**
3....
4•••
Degrees of
freedom
F-test
27
F(2,27)=0.96
29
F(2,29)=1.0l
29
F(2,29)=0.24
28
F(2,28)=0.16
29
F(2,29)=2.32
5••• lnCHGl
or 2
·6;•• lnCHGl -.0010·
(0.49)
~: See Table 1 and Beller (1974, appendix A).
~: All relative emploYment regressions include the District of Columbia and exclude
Alaska,:Hawaii" North Dakota, and Montana. Some other states are excluded from equations
in which the enforcement measure equaled zero, since the variables are in' logs.
t~statistics are in parentheses.
*,**,***Significant at the 10 percent, 5 Fercent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.20
TABLE 3
Coefficients· and Significance of Incidence of Enforcement Variables
by Issue from Log~Linear Regression Equations on the Change in
Relative Black Employment from 1966-1970 by Occupation and
Total for Covered Firms in the United States
Officials Office
and and
Managers Professionals Technical Sales Clerical
1... InEMCHGl .1366 -.0366 -.0052 .1565
(2.20)** (0.49) (0.04) (2.81)***
2
2... lnEMCHG1 .0011
(0.23)
3••• lnWACHG1 .1570 .1295 -.2041
(0.51) (1.14) (3.92)***
4•••
2
.0046 1nWACHGl .0054 .0076
(1.52) (1.27) (0.53)
5••• Degrees of
freedom 22 24 22 23 25
6••• F-test F(2,22)=2.50* F(2,24)=4.75*** ~(3,22)=0.33 F(2,23)=3.30* F(2,25)=8.89***
Service
Craftsmen Operatives Laborers Workers Total
1••• 1nEMCHG1 1.273 .0516 -.4711 -.2334 .0049
(2.43)** (0.90) (1.43) (0.73) (0.13)
2.•• 1nEMCHG12 .0728 -.0259 -.0142
(2.48)** (1.40) (0.77)
3•.• 1nWACHG1 -.6881 .6847 -.0073 .1891
(1.58) (2.46)** (0.11) (1.22)
4... 1nWACHGl2 -.0375 .0018 .0342 .0101
(1.73)* (0.63) (2.46)** (1.35)
5•.. Degrees of
freedom 24 26 24 25 25
6••• F-test 11'(4,24)=1. 70 F(2,26)=0.33 F(4,24)=1.77 F(3.25)=0.24 £(3,25)=0.83
Source: Table 1 and Beller (1974, appendix A).
*,**,***Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.21
Perhaps the first question that should be answered is whether
enforcement of Title VII bad any effect on relative black employment in
the covered sector during its initial period of enforcement, 1966-1970.
The last column in the lower panel of Table 2 shows the estimated co-
efficients of enforcement on the change in total relative black employment.
The question is answered in the affirmative; the estimated coefficients
are individually significant at the 5 percent level and approach joint
significance at the 10 percent level. What is perhaps unexpected is
that the curve showing the adjustment of relative employment as a function
of the incidence of enforcement is U-shaped. An increase in enforcement
reduces relative employment at low levels of enforcement and increases
it at higher levels. The change occurs at 0.14 standard deviations from
the unweighted mean of lnCHG1, well within the range. of observable data.
The estimated relationship suggests that, ceteris paribus, states
with a high incidence of enforcement have smaller changes in relative
employment than states with the lowest incidence of enforcement. However,
a 95 percent confidence belt around the estimated relationship includes
values that imply slightly larger relative employment changes in high-
38 enforcement states. In order to determine the magnitude of the
enforcement effect, the difference between the level of relative employ-
ment in 1970 at the lowest observed point and that at the mean incidence
of enforcement was calculated. Increasing enforcement to the mean reduces
relative employment by 25 percent.
The curves showing the adjustment of relative black employment in the
blue-collar occupations. (except service workers) as a function of the
incidence of enforcement .are also U-shaped, but the estimated coefficients
are insignificant. The adjustment elasticities are negative for the22
professional and office and clerical occupations and positive for the
sales occupation. According to the estimates, doubling the incidence
of enforcement reduces relative employment in the professional
occupation by 14 percent and in the office and clerical occupation by
7 percent, while it causes an increase of 14 percent in the sales occupation.
Enforcement of the employment provision and enforcement of the wage
provision of Title VII are generally seen to have opposing effects on
relative black employment (see Table 3), effects that underlie the
overall enforcement effect shown in Table 2. It was hypothesized that
enforcement of the employment provision would have a positive effect
and enforcement of the wage position a negative effect on relative
employment in covered firms. For those occupations in which the separate
effects are significant, they are in the hypothesized direction. For
example, the significant positive effect of the employment provision
and the insignificant negative effect of the wage provision underlie
the overall insignificant positive relationship between incidence of
enforcement and relative employment of officials and managers. The
wage provision has a strong negative effect on relative black employment
in the office and clerical occupation, which dominates the weaker
f 1 i · 39 positive effect 0 the emp oyment prov s~on.
B. The Effect of Enforcement on Employment in the Economy
The theoretical analysis resulted in ambiguous predictions about
the direction of the enforcement effects on relative black employment in
the economy as a whole. These effects are estimated using the equation
previously described with the variables defined as in Tabie 1.
Changes in total relative black employment from 1960-1970 and 1950-196023
and the ratio of the 1960-1970 to the 1950-1960 change are estimated.
The 1950 data are from the U.S. Census. (The independent variables in
the latter equation are specified in ratio form except for the dummy
and enforcement variables and except for the proportion of employment in
firms with federal contracts, PFC, which enter as in the 1960-1970
equation.) One additional variable, PEMCOV, a proxy for the proportion
of employment in firms covered by Title VII, has been added to these
regressions. Its coefficient may be interpreted as the partial effect
of the degree of coverage of the law holding constant the incidence of
enforcement. Table 4 presents OLS estimates of the coefficients on
PEMCOV and on the enforcement variables from these equations.
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(The
complete equations with the enforcement variable defined differently may
be found in Beller, 1974, appendix B. The coefficients on the independent
variables in the 1960-1970 equation do not differ significantly from
those in the 1966-1970 equation for total covered employment,which are
presented in Appendix B.)
According to the estimates in the first column of Table 4, the
short-run adjustment elasticity of relative black employment in the
economy with respect to the overall incidence of enforcement is negative
but is not significantly different from zero. On the other hand,
enforcement of the employment and wage provisions has significant effects
on relative employment; the adjustment elasticity has an inverted U-shape
with respect to the employment provision and a U-shape with respect to the
wage provision. All of the coefficients are individually and jointly
significant at the 5 percent level. A significant positive elasticity of
relative employment with respect to the s.ize of the covered sector
(PEMCOV) is observed.24
TABLE 4
Coeff.icients and Significance of Incidence of Enforcement Variables
from Log-Linear Regression Equations on t:;he·Changein Total
Relative Black Employment from 1960-1970 and 1950-1960, and
on the Ratio. of These Changes, for the United States
Estimated Coefficients and t-stat1stics
1960-1970 1950-1960 Ratio of Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PEMCOV 1.108 1.253 1.144 1.116 .052 .321
(1.81)* (2.87)*** (2.37)** (2.40)** (0.14) (1.15)
IncHG1 -.028
(1. 67)
'.
•0013
t '-
IncHG12 -.0002
(0.93) (0.22)
InEMcHG1 -.446 -.035
(2.39)** (1.13)
lllEMCHG12 -.026 -.002
(2.45)** (1.14)
InWACHG1 .352 .044
(2.38)** (1.31)
lnWACHG12 .020 .003
(2.69)** (2.16)**
Degrees of
freedom 28 22 30 26 29 25
F-test for ... F(4,22)- F(2,30)- F(2.25)-
charges 3.45** 0.93 3.20*
Source: See Table 1 and Beller (1974, appendix A). The data for the 1950-
, 1960 equations 'are taken from the 1950 and 1960 Censuses.
Note: Since the incidence ofen£orcement is always a fraction, the entire
relationship falls in a negative quadrant.
*,**,***Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
t The square of the logarithm of the incidence of enforcement is inversely
related to the logarithm; hence, this coefficient implies a negative effect of
enforcement on the dependent variable.25
Moreover, the enforcement variables are unrelated to the change
in relative employment during the pre-enforcement decade, 1950-1960
(columns 3 and 4). These results are taken as evidence that there
were no systematic differences among the states in the dependent variable
correlated with subsequent variations in enforcement activities. This-
evidence lends support to the in~erpretationof the coefficients on
the enforcement variables from the 1960-1970 cross-section equations.
On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on the coverage variable
are posi~ive and significant in both cross-sections and do not differ
significantly between them. Thus, the effect of PEMCOV on relative
employment appears to be independent of its status as a proxy for the
degree of coverage of Title VII; it is, by definition, an estimate of
the proportion of employment in middle~ andlarge~sizedfirms.
Direct estimates of· the effects of enforcement are derived from
equations on the ratio of the 1960-1970 change in relative black employ-
ment to the 1950-1960 change (columns 5 and 6). The estimates suggest
that a portion of the differential change in relative employment between
the two decades is explained by enforcement. Overall, enforcement reduced
the 1960-1970 change relative to the 1950-1960 change; the estimated
coefficient approaches significance at the 10 percent level (column 5).
Enforcement of the employment provision had an insignificant positive
effect and enforcement of the wage provision a significant negative effect
on the differential change between the decades. These variables are
jointly significant at the 10 percent level· (column 6).
In summary, it has been found that enforcement of Title VII had
effects on total relative black employment in the economy (Table 4)
that are similar to those found on relative employment in the covered26
sector (Tables 2 and 3). The adjustment elasticity of relative
employment with respect to enforcement is negative overall. The
elasticity is positive with respect to the employment provision and nega-
tive with respect to the wage provision; the estimated elasticities are
jointly significant for total employment in the economy and for some
occupations in the covered sector. Within the context of the theoretical
framework, these results imply that (1) enforcement of the employment
provision reduces relative black employment in firms that relocate by a
smaller amount than it increases relative black employment in firms
that comply, and (2) enforcement of the wage provision reduces relative
black employment in the covered sector by a larger amount than is
absorbed in the uncovered sector.
III. Empirical Analysis: Relative Wages
In this section, the effects of enforcement of Title VII on the
relative wages of nonwhite males in the economy are estimated using
41 data from the u.s. Census. In the theoretical analysis, the direction
of the effects is ambiguous. It is found that enforcement of the employ-
ment provision increased the percentage change in relative wages between
1959 and 1969 and that enforcement of the wage provision decreased the change.
Overall, enforcement had a negative but insignificant effect on the percent-
age change in relative wages during this period. The interpretation of
these results is supported by estimates made for the previous decade,
1949-1959.
The model of relative wages used here, with minor differences, has
appeared previously in the empirical literature on discrimination. The
specification was originally made by Landes (1968) in his study of the27
effect of state fair-employment laws on the relative wages of nonwhite
workers, and was modified by Ashenfelter (1972) in his study of
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the effect of unionism on relative wages. The model was originally
estimated using 1959 cross-sectional data; a 'variable representing
fair-employment laws passed during the sixties is now added to the
model. Each of the variables is measured in terms of its percentage
change from 1959 to 1969, or from 1949 to 1959, except for the dummy
and enforcement variables. The latter are as previously defined
except that they are in linear rather than logarithmic form and exclude
43 enforcement data for fiscal year 1970.
The regression model is linear and takes the following form:
+ B6FEPC58 + B7FEPCA58 + B8%6UNION + B
9
CHG2 + B
10
CHG22 + u.
The variables are defined and their sources stated in Table 5.44 A value
for each of the variables is assigned to each state.
A. The Effect of Enforcement on Relative Wages in the Economy
Table 6 presents OLS estimates of regression equations on the
percentage change in the ratio of nonwhite to white ~a1e wages in. the
u.s. These equations were also estimated by TSLS with enforcement
treated as endogenous; the reason has been discussed previously (see
page 15 and note 34). There are no significant differences from
the OLS estimates.45 The equation in column 1 is estimated without
a variable measuring the-enforcement of Title VII; that in column 2,
with a variable measuring the overall incidence of enforcement; and
that in column 3, with variables measuring separately the incidence of
f f h 1 d i · 46 en orcement 0 t e emp. oyment an wage prov sJ.o/ns.
(3.1)28
TABLE 5
List of Variables Used in Wage Analysis
Variable
Name
RWAGE
RINC
RNUM
ltURBAN
Definition
The ratio of nonwhite to white male average wages. The
average wage of nonwhite (white) males in each state is
estimated by average annual earnings of nonwhite (white)
males divided by average weeks wor.ked of nonwhite (white)
males. As Landes (1966) pointed out, the ratio of these
measures is more correctly an estimate of relative weekly
earnings. Data are from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses.
The ratio of nonwhite to white male average annual income~
Data not available from the censuses are from Landes
(19..66, appendix A).
The ratio of nonwhite to white males in the civilian labor
force.
The ratio of mean years of school completed of nonwhite to white
males over 15 years of age and not enrolled in school, a proxy
for the ratio of marginal products.
The proportion of nonwhite males in urban areas divided by
the proportion of white males in urban areas. Males not
in the civilian labor force are excluded.
Proportion of all males in urban areas. Males not in the
civilian labor force are excluded.
SOUTH Same as in Table 1.
FEPC58 Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states with Fair
Employment Practices commissions established prior to 1959
and zero elsewhere.
FEPCA58 Dummy variable assigned a value of one for states with Fair
Employment Practices commissions established in 1959 or
later and zero elsewhere.
UNION Same as in Table 1 for 1970. The figure for 1960 was
approximated by a simple average of figures for 1953 and
1964. Data for 1953 are from Troy (1957) and for 1964
from the Directory of National and International Labor
Unions in the U.S. 1969.
CHG2, EMCHG2,
and WACHG2 Same as in Table 1 'excluding data for fiscal year 1970.
L~: Data. are from the 1950, 1960,and 1970 Censuses unless otherwise noted.TABLE 6
Regression Equations on the Percentage Change in the Ratio of Nonwhite to White Male Wages
from 1959 to 1969 for the United States30
An increase in the overall incidence of enforcement caused a more
than proportionate reduction in the percentage change in relative wages
between 1959 and 1969 (column 2). This effect is, however, insignificant.
2 Evaluated at the mean value of eHG , and assuming that the estimated
relationship is the true relationship, the effect of enforcement accounts
for a 9.5 percent reduction in the percentage change in relative wages
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between 1959 and 1969 in the U.S. Enforcement of the employment
provision had a more than proportionate positive effect and enforcement
of the wage provision had a linear negativ~ effect on the percentage
change in relative wages (column 3); the estimated coefficients are
significant at the 10 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.
According to the F~statistic, they are jointly significant at the
5 percent level. The strength of the negative effect of the wage
provision relative to the positive effect of the employment provision
accounts for the estimated insignificant negative overall effect of
enforcement.
As noted previously, differences observed in a single cross-section
may have existed prior to enforcement. Hence, it would be desirable to
estimate the percentage change in relative wages between 1949 and 1959
and the ratio of the 1959-1969 change to the 1949-1959 change using the
enforcement variables from the original cross-section. However, the
data used to estimate wages are not available for 1949. Therefore, income
48 must be used as a proxy for wages.
First, the estimated effect of enforcement on income and wages will
be compared for the period 1959-1969, when data on both are available.
Results of regression equations on the percentage change in the ratio of
nonwhite to white male annual income from 1959 to 1969 for the U.S. are
presented in the first three columns of Table 7. (The equations are the31
same as those on relative wages in Table 6.) The regressions with the
enforcemeritvariables were estimated by TSLS; the coefficients differed
significantly in a positive direction from coefficients estimated by
OLS (see page 27 and note 45). Income appears to be a relatively good
proxy for wages for use in the subsequent analysis: The estimated
enforcement effects are in the same direction.and have the same form as
those on relative wages. The only difference is that they are less
. 49
significant•
B. Comparison of Intercensa1 Changes in Relative Income
In this section, income data will be used to determine whether, prior
to enforcement, there were systematic'differences among the states that
were correlated with the variation in enforcement activities during
the 1959-1969 census decade. Table 7 presents regression equations for
the u.s. on the percentage change in relative income from 1949 to 1959
(columns 4 through 6) and on the ratio of the percentage change between
1959 and 1969 to that between 1949 and 1959 (columns 7 through 9). The
equations of columns 4 through 7 were estimated with the OLS technique
and the others with the TSLS technique. The independent variables in
the ratio equations are expressed as the ratio of percentage changes
except for the South and fair-employment dummies and for the enforcement
variables, which enter as in all previous equation.s.
According to the estimates in columns 5 and 6, the overall incidence
of enforcement and enforcement of the employment and wage provisions are
unrelated to the percentage change in relative income in the pre-enforcement
decade, 1949-1959. Therefore, it may be concluded that no systematic
differences existed during this period that were correlated with subsequent
complaint patterns. This evidence lends support to the interpretation...~;:.-
TABLE 7
Regression Equations on the Percentage Change in the Ratio of Nonwhite to White Male
Annual Income from 1959 to 1969 and from 1949 to 1959~ and on the Ratio of These
Percentage Changes, for the United States
, :;ii ; £.11 4 ., £ ..... v If; L"...r;, 'Wif =
Est.irn.ated Coefficients and t-statistics
Percentage Change 1959-1969 PercentDJe ChaIY:Je 1949-1959
OLS
(4) (5) (6)
-.074 -.071 -.075
(1.13) (L07) (L10) v.>
N
-.038 -0015 -0037
(0.12) (O.05) (0.12)
.224 .214 .225
(1.33) (1.26) (L27)
.,200 .232 .241
(1.29) (1.42) (1.44)
-.141 -.131 -0142
(4.02) (3.39) (2068)
.0.
.C~4:.,,)
Indenendent
Variables
'Relative
numbers
Relative t
education-
~lativeur-
banization
Urbanization
SoUth
FEPC58
FE..tlCA58
t:"n:ionization
OLS
(1)
.021
(0.35)
..203
(0.81)
-.057
(0.85)
- ..489
(3.40)
;.089
(2.88)
-.075
(2.38)
- .. 074
(2.91)
-.064
(0.60)
(2)
-.005
(0008)
..344
(1.07)
-.078
(l.09)
- ..527
(3.53)
.,091
(3007)
- ..086
(2..50)
- ..093
(2.47)
-.105
(0.88)
TSLS
(3)
-0135
(1.19)
-0330
(0.63)
-.210
(l.75)
-.629
(2.94)
.175 .
(2.99)
-.203
(2.67)
-.177
(2.55)
-.214
(1.25)
..244
(1.07)
..231
(1.01)
.275
{I.07).<i:· ~ .
• • ..;.. .' ,.c.. ,~·t.'·; _":''';it..~_~·•.•.., - ·1:;!y.:.:L(L.,...;.,:;",~,~:'tot.,.. ··.,~;-·,·.~'.:"':I;-"· .;. ...:l... .-...
TABLE 7 ......("'~tinued
Estimated Coefficients and t-statistics
Perce."'1tage Change 1959-1969 Percentage Change 1949-1959
OLS TSIS OLS
Indeperrlent
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CHG2 ·.. -.435 X 102 ·..
. 0 a 0 -.256 X 102
(0.67) (0.67)
CI-K;22 ·.. .0. ·..
ll.QiG2 ... • • 0 ·..
EECHG22 . ·.. • • 0 .569 X 106 ... ... -.938 X 105 w
(lo60) (0.63)
~
't'JACHG2 ... ·.. -.780 X 103 ... ... .315 X 102
(2.07)** (0.20)
WACHG22 ·.. • eo ,_
Constant .096 .113 .261 ~056 .053 .054
(2.27) (2.38) (2.63) (lA2) (1.34) (1.33)
R2 .600 .11I'- • ... .412 .419 .421~.. _.(.,
TABLE 7--continued
Estimated coefficients and t-statistics
Ratio of Percentage Changes Ratio of Percentage Changes
GIS TSIS
Independent GIS TSIS
Independent
Variables (7) (8) (9) variables (7) (8) (9)
Relative -.165 -.138 -.258 CHG2 ·.. -.114 X 104
numl:ers (1.62) (0.75) (1.74) (0.85)
Relative -.355 .623 -.725 QK;22 ·.. .715 X 106
education (0.75) (0.44) (1.08) (0.84)
Relative ur- -.006 .058 -.054 DUIG2
banizatioo. (0.04) (0.24) (0032)
Urbanization -.278 -1.126 .221 D1CIIG22 ·.. ·.. .810 X 106 t.J
(0.82) (0.95) (0.34) (1.10)
~
SCUth .206 .262 .306 ii7-\CBG2 ·.. ·.. -.721 X 103
(3.95) (2.20) (2.80) (1.19)
FEPC58 -.113 -.113 - ..192 WACffi22 ·.. ·.. ...
(1.58) (0.88) (1.71)
FEPCA58 -.108 -.111 -.142 constant 2.361 1.926 2.454
(1.93) (0.99) (l.63) (3.60) (1.41) (2.93)
Unionization -.526 -.220 -.537 R2 .564 ·.. 9 ••
(2006) (0.38) (1.69)
-~. ~~ ~
Source: See Table 5, Beller (1974), and Landes (1966).
t The ratio of nonwhites to whites in 1949 and the ratio of nonwhite to white males in later years.
**For enforcement variables, significant at the 5 percent level.~.
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of the coefficients on the enforcement variables from the 1959-1969
relative income percentage change equations. Moreover, since it has
been established that relative income is a good proxy for relative wages,
the evidence supports the interpretation of the relative wage estimates
as well,'
Finally, estimates of the effects of enforcement from equations on
the ratio of the 1959--1969 to the 1949-1959 percentage change in relative
income are shown in columns 8 and 9. The overall incidence of enforcement
has an insignificant effect on the differential change in relative
income between the decades. The effect of enforcement of the employment
provision is positive and more than proportionate, and the effect of
enforcement of the wage provision is negative and linear; these results
show the same direction and form as those estimated using the 1959-1969
percentage change equations. Moreover, although insignificant at
conventional test levels, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the
e~ploymerit and wage provision variables from this formulation are
quite close to those from the 1959-1969 percentage change equation.
. .
Despite their relative insignHicance, the similarity of the estimates
between the two forms suggests that the effect of enforcement has been
correctly estimated. Moreover, in the previous section it was shown that
enforcement had a weaker effect on income than on wages. Hence, it is
not unlikely that the estimated coefficients would have been significant
had data on relative wages been available for the analysis.
In this section, the effects of the enforcelllent of Title VII on
the percentage change in relative wages between 1959 and 1969 were
estimated. It was found that (1) the overall effect of enforcement is
negative but insignificant, (2) the effect of enforcement of the employ-36
ment provision is positive, more than proportionate, and signi~icant, and
(3) the effect of enforcement of the wage provision is negative, linear,
and significant. Moreover, it was established that these enforcement
variables were unrelated to the percentage change in relative income in
the pre-enforcement decade, 1949-1959, using relative income as a proxy
for relative wages. Finally, the effects of enforcement on the ratio
of the 1959-1969 percentage change to the 1949-1959 percentage change in
relative income were estimated. While the overall effect was insignificant,
the effects of enforcement of the employment and wage provisions were
the same as those stated above. These results are taken as evidence
that the enforcement effects on relative wages in the 1959-1969
percentage change equations have been correctly estimated. The in-
significance of the ratio estimates by conventional test standards is
unimportant in this regard since enforcement was found to have had a
more significant effect on wages than on income in the original 1959-1969
cross-section.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This study has investigated whether and to what extent enforcement
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 helped to achieve the
social goal of eliminating (or reducing) employment discrimination. To
that end, a model was developed and tested that measures the effects of
enforcement on t.he minority economic position in all firm,s under the law's
jurisdiction: the direct effects in respondent firms and the demonstration
effects in all, including nonrespondent, covered firms. The demonstration
effect was hypothesized to be a function of the incidence of the law's
enforcement.37
The evidence suggests that in the aggregate t from its inception
though fiscal year 1970t enforcement of Title VII at best left the
economic position of black males unchanged and at worst caused it to
deteriorate.' The explanation appears to be simply that enforcement of
the employment and wage provisions of the law had opposing effects on
relative black employment and wages. While enforcement of the employ-
ment provision increased relative employment in covered firms and
relative employment and wages in the economy, enforcement of the wage
provision had precisely the opposite effects. Within the theoretical
framework, these results suggest that the following occurred. The
increase in demand for black relative to white males in covered firms
that remained in business at the same location worked its way through
the economy, resulting in overall increases in relative employment and
wages. Hence, any secondary reductions in the relative demand for
blacks resulting from the locational mobility of firms were weak compared
with the primary effect. On the other hand, while enforcement of the
wage provision probably resulted in increased wages for some blacks
in covered firms (this could not be tested with available data), it
also created an excess supply of blacks, thus depressing their relative
wage in other sectors of the economy. Moreover, the latter effect appears
to have dominated the former, although the net negative impact was, in
general, statistically insignificant. In addition, the magnitude of the
observed enforcement effects on relative employment and wages was found
to vary directly with the incidence of enforcement across states.
It is concluded from these findings that the economics of enforce-
ment of Title VII, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been inconsistent38
with the social policy goal. While the results are broadly consistent
with those of past Title VII studies, that is, that enforcement overall
had little effect, they demonstrate the necessity of a more detailed
causal analysis. It has been shown that the law's overall enforcement
effect can be decomposed into two separate and opposing effects. An
advantage of this decomposition for policy analysis is that it suggests
modifications to the enforcement procedure that would move it closer to
the goal of reducing employment discrimination. Two possible directions
for enforcement are (l) concentrating limited resources on enforcement
of the employment provision and (2) accompanying enforcement of the
wage provision by strict and extensive controls on minority employment.
While the first alternative relies solely on the economics of enforcement
to bring about the desired results, the second requires additional
enforcement powers to accomplish the law's goal. The power to issue
cease and desist orders would enable the EEOC to limit the enforcement
effects that work against this goal.39
APPlj;NDIX A
It will be showu,in this appendix that (i) dB!dk> 0, (i~ dW!dk < 0, and
(iii) deW +B)!dk < 0, where k is a government-eriforced employment ratio of blacks,
B, to whites, W, and the firm's utility is assumed to be a function of profits,
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TI, and the number of blacks employed:
u = 1:l(tr, B)
with ul
> 0, Uz < 0, ull <0; and uzz '<"0.
* * (i) Let k B = Wand note that k = 11k •
Then u can be rewritten as
* * u = u{Pof[B(l + k )] - B(wWk + wB), B} ,
where P is the price of output, f is the production function with f' > 0 and
o
f" < 0, ,and Ww and wB are'the wages of whites and blacks respectively. Assuming
* that u is a concave function and maximizing u with respect to Band k yields
* * au = ul[Pof' (1 + k ) (wwk + w
B
)] + Uz O.
aB
*
Then p' f' = wWk +wB
Uz
0
* * 1 + k ul (1 + k )
(AI)
* and 1f k is voluntarily selected,
(AZ)
then Pof'= wW•
Set P == 1. o
Totally differentiating equation (AI), we obtain
* i~ f"[(1 + k )dR+ Bdk ] ....
* Ww dk
* (1 + k )
* Ww+ w
B dk
(l + k*)Z
+
* Uz dk
----+
, -Ie Z
ul (1 + k )40
Now, if u12 ;::: 0,
(
* u22
dB f"(l .....k )+ *
ul (1 + k )
* l+k
After simplifying with the a~d of (AI) and (A2), we obtain
f"B = - 2 * u.22 u2 ul1 f" (1 + k ) + -.....;:=.,,.;..-.~*- + -=-3"':==---*--
u1(1 + k) ul (1 + k )
Since the expression in brackets is positive,
dB dB
---;; < 0 and - > 0 •
dk dIe
* (ii) dW* ;::: B + k* dB* = B(l + ~ dB*)
dk dk B dIe
* f"k
= B 1 - 2 * uZ·2 · .... u2 ull f"k + f" + ----...;.:;:...- + --=---===--
* 3 * ul(l + k) u1 (1 + k )41
* Since fllk .appears in both the numerator and the denominator, the e.xpre'ssion in
the inner brackets is less than 1 and is positive. Hence,
dW* > 0 and dW < a .
dk dk
(iii) d (W + B)' = dW +dB =
* * * dk dk' 'dk
* fllk + f"
:2 * uZZ Uz ull fllk" .+ f" + ,:----==--- +---=-=--1
1( 3 * ul (1 + k) ul (1 + k )
* Since fllk + fll appears in both the numerator and the lienominator, the expression
in the inner brackets is less than 1 and is positive. Hence,
deW +*B) > 0 and deW + B) < 0 •
dk 'dk
It is possible to sho~ using the second-order conditions~that these results
also hold when u12
~ o."
43
.APPENDIX B
In this appendix, the complete equation on the change in total rela-
tive black male employment in covered firms between 1966 and 1970 is
presented with discussion of the important independent variables other
than the enforc~ment of Title VII.
The equation is as follows:
.692 + .053EMPL + .215CRMPL + .29lPPB + .089CPPB + .136GMR
(0.80) (1.73) (0.66) (4.87) (0.50) (2.29)
.119UNEMPL + .049CUNEMPL + .245PFC + .327CHG1 + .02lCHG12
(1.64) (0.35) (1.54) (2.05) (2.16)
(Bl)
+ .101FEPC64;-.007UNION - .105SMSA + .162S0UTH + .()29MFG
(1.21) (0.10) (1.09) (1.88) (0.45)
2 + .706RBE66. R = .9975. Number of observations 46.
(11.23)
The discussion encompasses the effects of (1) other equal employ-
ment opportunity legislation, (2) the lagged value of the dependent variable,
and (3) the supply variables and South dummy.
(1) As stated in the text above, the federal contract compliance (PFC)
and.8tate fair-employment law (FEPC64) variables are expected to be posi-
tively related to changes in relative black employment. As seen in equation
(Bl), both variables have positive coefficients; .the coefficient on PFC is
significant at the 10 percent level using a one-tail test. Moreover, the
coefficient on PFC is positive for all occu~ations and is significant at
the 5 percent level for the technical and sales occupations. ~~ile the
coefficient on FEPC64 is positive for most· occupations, the only signifi-
cant one is for the laborer occupation. The short-run adjustment elasticity
of relative employment with respect to the proportion of employment in fjrms
with federal contracts ranges between .04 for officials ann manaeers and
.91 for the sales occupations, with a modal value of .25.44
(2) The coefficient on the lagged value of the dependent variable
(RBE66) is equa1t() (l-A), where A is the adjustment coefficient of rela-
tive employment to its target level. While these coefficients are
significantly different from one for all occupational equations, they
differ in magnitude. The modal adjustment coefficient.is approximately
equal to .2; they range from a low of .1 for operatives to a high of .8
for sales. The rate of adjustment is generally lower for the b1ue-
collar than for the white-collar occupations.
(3) Aside from those discussed ahove, the most important independent
variables in the equations are the supply variables. Excluding RBE66,
PPB is generally the most significant independent variable and is con-
sistently positive. Ceteris paribus, the greater the proportion of the
population in a state that is black, the greater the change in relative
employment. The adjustment elasticity of relative employment with respect
to PPB ranges between .18 for the operative occupation and .60 for the
professional occupation; the modal values are .2 and .3. The gross
migration rate (GMR) is positive and significant for officials and man-
agers, craftsmen, and total relative employment. The coefficient on the
relative educational level of black males (RED), waich entered the equations
for the white-collar occupations only, is very high and significant for the
professional and sales occupations; the adjustment elasticities are 2.4 and
2.6 respectively. These results indicate that an available pool of black
labor led to greater changes in their relative employment.
Of substantial interest is the consistently positive (except for the
professional occupation) coefficient on the So~th dummy. The coefficients
are significant for the craftsmen and operative occupations and for total
relative employment. They range between .03 for officiC'.lt3 and managers and45
.37 for craftsmen. (The coefficient for the professional occupation
equals -.4 and is significant at the 10 percent level.) Stated simply,
blacks made greater employment gains in covered firms in the South than
outside the South between 1966 and 1970 in 'all categories of employment
except professional.47
NOTES
1. The commission, which was established by Title VII, has the power to
receive and investigate charges of discrimination filed hy aggrieved
individuals or by a memher of the commission who has reasonable cause
to believe that discrimination has occurred. It may also conduct
technical studies and provide technical assistance designed to further
compliance with the law. It must 3ubmit an annual repQrt to Congress
and to the President.
2. The analysis in this paper focuses on blacks, and mbre specifically
on black males, because the majority of complaints filed under Title
VII through fiscal year 1970 were filed for discrimination on the
basis of Negro race'and the majority of these were filed by black
males. Charges filed for discrimination on the basis of sex formed
a constant 20 percent of complaints during this period.
3. The uncovered sector consists of those employed in firms with fewer
than 25 employees, those employed in firms not in an "industry affect-
ing conunerce," the self-employed, those employed by religious institu-
tions or by the federal, state, or local governments, and the unemployed.
In 1968, about 25 percent of all employees in'Social Security reporting
units worked in units with fewer than 20 employees. (In 1972, the law
was amended to bring within the covered sector those employed in firms
with 15 to 24 employees and in government.) The uncovered sector, along
with covered firms that continue to violate the law, determines the
elasticity of supply of black labor to firms in the covered sector that
choose compliance and, therefore, the magnitude of relative employment
and wage changes that result from enforcement.
4. Laws like Title VII affect the behavior of firms through economic incen-
tives; firms violating the law's provisions are subject to lengthy and
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deteiled investigations. They may also face costly court battles,
which may result in court-ordered adjustments in hiring and personnel
practices, back-pay settlements, attorney's fees, court costs, and
adverse publicity.
5. Although this classification is not exhaustiv.e, it is useful for
current purposes. Other practices covered by the law, which are not
classified under either of these provisions, include discrimination
in terms and conditions, job classification, qualification and testing,
advertising, benefits, and intimidation and reprisals.
6. The development here is based upon the analysis of featherbedding; for
a good treatment see Simler (1965).
7. Court decisions under Title VIr have stressed the importance of such
statistical pro~fs in cases where unlawful exclusion has been charged.
(EEOC, Fifth Annual Report, p. 20.) Although the discussion that
follows is based upon a fixed-propprtion work rule, for practical
purposes the rule may be considered to have an acceptable range of
variation around it that would constitute compliance.
8. The implications of the analysis are similar under the assumption that
blacks are imperfect substitutes in production for whites lsee Beller,
1974, pp. 33-34.)
9. In the case of employer discrimination against blacks, employers with
the lowest tastes for discrimination hire all blacks while those with
the highest tastes hire all whites. Those employers tha~ are just'
indifferent between blacks and whites at the current wage ratio are
integrated. In the case of fellow employee discrimination, blacks and
whites are not hired in the same job because whites would have to be
compensated for working with blacks. Integration occurs where whites'49
distaste for working with blacks is just compensated by the current
market wage differential. (See Becker, 1971, pp. 39-58.)
10. If relative gross wages are equal in both occupations, then for a firm
to hire all blacks in Ll and all whites in L2, d2B must be greater than dlB'
If L1 is a low-skilled occupation and L2 a higher-skilled occupation,
this condition implies that firms have greater tastes for discrimination
against higher-skilled than against lower-skilled blacks.
11. Of course, the total employment of blacks and whites at N in panel III
must be consistent with that obtained from panels I and II.
12. It is unlikely that firms will move solely in response to enforcement.
This will be one factor in the decision to move and will directly affect
the choice of a new location. Of course, the preceding argument is only
valid in the long run. In his large study of black employmp.nt in the
South, Ray Marshall discovered that firms moving into the South moved
into counties with relatively small black populations. l~en queried
about the reasons for this choice of location, firms cited, among other
reasons, the fear of enforced quotas of black employment. Given the
relative immobility of the black population due to discrimination in
housing and to poor public transportation, large movements of firms
could significantly worsen employment opportunites for blacks. This
problem deserves further study.
13. On the average, firms may be eJ(pected to move into an area with a black-
to-white labor force ratio to which they are just indifferent at the
current wage ratio. This would be approximated by the in pre-enforce-
ment black-to-white employment ratio. In such a case, relative employ-
ment and wages in the covered sector would remain the same or increase,
but would not fall.50
14. For a treatment of the case of imperfect substitutes see Beller (1974,
pp. 41-43).
15. If the firms affected by enforcement are only a small proportion of the
industry, then the supply price of the industry may not be affected very
much. Since industry~ide enforcement was not a common practice prior
to 1970, this was probably true of the period under consideration in
this study.
16. The relative wage in the uncovered sector will fall if the ratio of blacks
to whites moving into employment in that sector is greater than the ratio
of bla~ks to whites already employed there.
17. Whether there is a net outflow of blacks from the uncovered sector or a
net inflow into the sector depends upon the elasticity of demand (n) for
blacks and the turnover rate (0) in the covered sector. If n>o, as is
likely for the U.S., then there will be a net inflow to the uncovered
sector. This analysis is similar to the analysis by Jacob Mincer of the
effects of increasing the minimum wage (Mincer, 1974).
18. Since EEOC investigations cover all aspects of the firm's minority
employment practices, there is an incentive for the firm to make suffi-
cient adjustments in its practices to avoid discrimination charges.
19. The actual costs depend upon the seriousness with which the enforcement
agency prosecutes the violators and the nature of the firm's violations.
It is assumed that the first component of actual costs is constan~ across
firms during any given time period and that the firm is aware of the
costs associated with each level and type of violation.
20. As used here, proximity is defined by an information network, which may
be dete~ined by, for ~ample, nearness of location, common output,
common labor market, or any factor that determines the locus of the.
~~sseminaton of information about EEOC enforcement activities.i·1
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21. The monetary value of discrimination is a measure of the amount of
income a firm is willing to give up in order to indulge its desire to
discriminate. For a detailed discussion, see Becker (1971, pp. 39-54).
The choice between various types of compliance and violation depends
in part on whether a firm prefers a larger un~ertain income or a lower
income with certainty. For a discussion of risk preference as it re-
lates to the firm's decision to violate or comply with an antidiscri-
mination law, see Landes (1967). It is possible that some firms respond
more to an increase in penalties than to an increase in the probability
of apprehension. Their response depends upon their risk preferences.
For a discussion of thts point, see Landes (1966, p.19). In the current
study, it is assumed that the penalties for each type of violation
are known constants across firms•.(The penalties associated with-the
violation of Title VII were probably increased by the 1972 amendments
to the law; a future study might test the response of firms to that
increase.. )
22. This analysis depends upon the assumption that the direct effect of
enforcement, the change in relative employment ot wages in respondent
firms in the absence of knowledge of other enforcement activity, is not
itself a function of the.incidence of enforcement. If EEOC enforcement
activities were ordered by a sixe ranking of firms, then the size of
the direct effect could d~pend upon the incidence of enforcement. The
procedure followed by the EEOC has been to pursue discrimination charges
in the order in which they are received. Since most cha.rges are filerJ
by only a few individuals and filing a charge isa relatively costless
procedure,- there is no reason to expect that, for example, large firms
are charged first, and therefore, that the size of the direct effect is
related to the incidence of enforcement.52
23. For the period under study, which e~ds with 1970, the geographical
definition of proximity is quite reasonable for the following reasons:
(1) The enforcement activites of the EEOC have been carried out by
region through a set of regianal offices, and (2) it was only in 1972
that the EEOC instituted an industry-wide system of investigations.
Prior to that date, there was no feedback from the local to the national
level of information on the terms of agreements made with the EEOC.
Ideally, one would want to determine the exact locus of the demon-
stration effects by analyzing firms grouped by other (smaller) geo-
graphical units. Due to the cnnfidentiality requirements on the data
used, however, the smallest geographical unit that can be studied is
the state.
24. The original sources for these data are the EEO-l employer reports
collected annually by the EEOC from all firms with 100 employees or
more and from all firms with government contracts. These reports
contain information on employment by race and sex for each of the nine
broad census occupational categories. Unfortunately, they contain no in-
formation on wages. The entire matched sample contains 40,445 firms from
all industries. The matching process, the probl~ns involved, and the
potenti:a.l biases in,such. a sampling procedu:r~ are discussed in Ashenfelter
and Heckman (1974, pp. l4~26). They conclude from their statistical
analyses of the probability of a successful match that "inferences
drawn from our matched sample may not be too different from inferences
. . ,i that would have been drawn from the whole population of EEO-l reports.
The benefit of a matched sample for the statistical analysis of changes
is that characteristics of the firms that do not change between the two
years are automatically held constant. Moreover, this sample has the53
added benefit for purposes of this study of allowing the only possible
direct test of the theoretical model.
25. Estimates of the effects of enforcement on a broad measure of the
occupational distribution of black males relative to white males,
presented in Beller (1974), were found tO
k be ..1nsignificant ~e.nd.,are
not presented here. Likewise, no evidence was found that federal con-
tract compliance or state fair-employment laws improved the relative
occupational distribution of black males (see Ashenfelter and Heckman,
1974, and Landes, 1968). The combined results of these studies suggest
that, in general, equal employment opportunity legislation does not
affect the gross measure of the relative occupational status of black
males.
26. A similar model is used by Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) in estimating
the effects of federal contract compliance on changes in total relative
black employment.
27. Assuming that firms seek to avoid the investigation that follows the
filing of a charge, the number of charges recowmended for investigation·
is an alternative measure of C. This variable is highly correlated with
the number of charges filed, and empirical results using this definition
do not differ significantly from those presented below. While it might
have been desirable to consider the outcomes of investigated charges as
independent variables (in addition to charges which are investigated),
it is not possible to do so due to the recording methods used by the EEOC
in their case files. However, this is not considered a serious drawback,
s.ince once an investigation begins the firm incurs costs. Moreover,
this model is based upon the assumption that enforcement visibility alone
is an important determinant of whether or not the firm takes steps towards
compliance.54
28. Detailed data on charges filed, by basis, sex, and issue, are avail-
able from the Division of Systems and Cont~ol of the EEOC. (Data on
the aggregate numbers of charges filed by state are available from the
published EEOC Annual Reports.) The data used in this'study are charges
filed--by males and females from four of the minority groups covered by
Title VII--during fiscal years 1968-1970. These minorities include
two racial minoriti~s, Negro and American Indian, and two minorities on
the basis of national origin, Spanish American and Mexican American.
(The other minority groups covered by this' law, for whom data are not
used, are religious minorities and Orientals.) The largest proportion
of all charges filed by members of these groups, 62.4 percent, were filed
by Negro men. The employment analysis in this study is for black males
only; however, the provision of the law that allows the EEOC to investi-
gate all minority employment practices in a firm once it has been charged
with discrimination suggests that charges filad by members of any of these
minority gro~ps potentially affect the relative emploYment of black
males.
29. The law covers employees in firms with 25 or more employees. This measure
is approximated by the number of employees in Social Security reporting
units with 20 or more employees.
30. An ideal measure of the incidence of enforcement, which would take account
of the location of discrimination charges and of the black population in
a state, is unavailable; hence, the incidence measure used here is im-
perfect. Empirical results using the number of discrimination charges
as the measure of enforcement are presented in the author's dissertation
(Beller, 1974). These proxies, which yield similar estimates, form the
two extremes for the true measure of the incidence of enforcement.I·'
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31. This variable controls as well as possible for differences across states
in the current incidence of discrimination. For the matched sample of
covered firms, the level of relative black employment in 196h is expected
to reflect any changes in the incidence of discrimination that followed
the passage of Title VII in July of 1964. On the other hand, for the
economy as a whole, the level of relative black employment in 1960 would
not reflect such changes. To the extent that changes occurred and reSlUlted
in systematic variation 'across states in the incidence of discrim!nation,
and to, the extent that the: initial level of relative employment along with
the traditional demographic factors do not control for that variation, the
relative variation in CIN will not approximate the relative variation in
c/n. If the incidence of discrimination were negatively related to the
change in ~elative black employment across states, the estimated coeffi~
cients on the,enforcement variables would be negatively biased. This
factor is expected to have relatively little effect on the estimates for
the covered sector.
32. A detailed description of the data sources is found in Beller (1974,
appendix A.)
33. Clearly, other approximations of the underlying relationship would be
reasonable. All regressions were also run using a linear functional form.
Tests performed on the transformed residual sums of squares were consis-
tent with the assumption that the underlying relationship was more closely
approximated by the log-linear specification (see Box and Cox, 19~4).
Hence, the log-linear equations are ~resented in this paper; the linear
equations, which yield similar estimates of the enforcement effects, can
be found in Beller (1974, appendix B). The regressions are weighted by
the square root of total employment in 1970 in the covered sector in each
state to correct for heteroscedastic residuals.56
34. A priori, it is unclear in which direction the simultaneity might
operate: The demand for enforcement might be greater where relative
changes are larger and expectations are rising or where they are
smaller. For the relative employment equations, the first stage of the
simultaneous equations model postulates the incidence of enforcement as
a function of the change in relative black employment, the presence of
a regional office of the EEOC in a state, and the exogenous variables
in the model.
35. The degrees of freedom vary by occupation because some states had no
black males employed in some occupations in either 1966 or 1970. The
equations were also estimated excluding all states in which relative
black employment was less than 1 percent in either 1966 or 1970. The states
excluded were Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota,
MOntana, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah. The results were vittua1ly identical
to those obtained with these states included.
36. This selectivity has been used to highlight the exact nature of the
relationships that emerged for each occupation and to keep the tables
uncomplicated. The author has esti~tes of all specifications for all
occupations.
37. Note that the entire relationship falls in the negative quadrant because
the variables a~e measured as the logarithm of a fraction. Hence, positive
coefficients on both the linear and quadratic terms imply aU-shaped
parabola.
38. these confidence intervals or belts were calculated using the prediction
variance, which was very large (see Johnston, 1963, pp. 131-132).
39. The separate effects of enforcement of the provisions on the relative
employment of professionals and sales, though jointly significant, cannot55
31. This variable controls as well as possible for differences across states
in the current incidence of discrimination. For the matched sample of
covered firms, the level of relative black employment in 1966 is expected
to reflect any changes in the incidence of discrimination that followed
the passage of Title VII in July of 1964. On the other hand, for the
economy as a whole, the level of relative black employment in 1960 would
not reflect such changes. To the extent that changes occurred and reSlUlted
in systematic variation 'across states in the incidence of discrimination.
and to the extent that the: initial level of relative employment along with
the traditional demographic factors do not control for that variation, the
relative variation in CIN will not approximate the relative variation in
C/D. If the incidence of discrimination were negatively related to the
change in ~e1ative black employment across states, the estimated coeffi-
cients on the.enforcement variables lvould be negatively biased. This
factor is expected to have relatively little effect on the estimates for
the covered sector.
32. A detailed description of the data sources is found in Beller (1974,
appendix A.)
33. Clearly, other approximations of the underlying relationship would be
reasonable. All regressions were also run using a linear functional form.
Tests performed on the transformed residual sums of squares were consis-
tent with the assumption that the underlying relationship was more closely
approximated by the log-linear specification (see Box and Cox, 19~4).
Hence, the log-linear equations are presented in this paper; the linear
equations, which yield similar estimates of the enforcement effects, can
be found in Beller (1974, appendix B). The regressions are weighted by
the square root of total employment in 1970 in the covered sector in each
state to correct for heteroscedastic residuals.56
34. A priori, it is unclear in which direction the simultaneity might
operate: The demand for enforcement might be greater where relative
changes are larger and expectations are rising or where they are
smaller. For the relative employment equations, the first stage of the
simultaneous equations model postulates the incidence of enforcement as
a function of the change in relative black employment, the presence of
a regional office of the EEOC in a state, and the exogenous variables
in the mode1.
35. The degrees of freedom vary by occupation because some states had no
black males employed in some occupations in either 1966 or 1970. The
equations were also estimated excluding all states in which relative
black employment was less than 1 percent in either 1966 or 1970. The states
excluded were Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah. The results were virtually identical
to those obtained with these states included.
36. This selectivity has been used to highlight the exact nature of the
relationships that emerged for each occupation and to keep the tables
uncomplicated. The author has estimates of all specifications for all
occupations.
37. Note that the entire relationship falls in the negative quadrant because
the variables a~e measured as the logarithm of a fraction. Hence, positive
coefficients on both the linear and quadratic terms imply aU-shaped
parabola.
38. These confidence intervals or belts were calculated using the prediction
variance, which was very large (see Johnston, 1963, pp. 131-132).
39. The separate effects of enforcement of the provisions on the relative
employment of professionals and sales, though jointly significant, cannot57
be distinguished due to multicollinearity. A possible interpretation
of the significant coefficients on the enforcement variables is that
larger changes in relative black employment are indicative of an active
and aware black population that demanded more vigorous enforcement once
the law was passed. The existence of such an effect would become appar-
ent in equations on changes in relative employment during a period prior
to passage of the 1aw,estimated with the original enforcement measures
among the independent variables. Insignificant coefficients on these
variables would indicate the absence of systematic differences in the
dependent variable among the states. that'Nwere correlated "wtth 'su~quent
variation in enforcement activities. While there are no data from an
earlier period for the covered sector, the analysis of relative black
employment in the economy uses census data, which is available for earlier
years. Hence, it is possible to estimate the relationship between the
enforcement variables and the change in relative black employment in the
economy between 1950 and 1960, prior to enforcement, in the same manner
as we estimate the change between 1960 arid 1970, when enforcement occurred.
The enforcellient effect will also he estimated directly from an equation.
on the ratio of the 1960-1970 to the 1950-1960 change in relative employ-
ment. The coefficients on the enforcement variables from these equations
yield estimates of how enforcement caused the change in relative emp1oy~
ment in the enforcement decade to d;Lf;fer :!;rom, the change ;Ln the ptre-enfol;'ce-
ment decade.
40. Coefficients on the enforcement variables from T818 estilMtes did not
differ significantly fronn the 018 estimates (see page 15 and note 34).
T818 estimation not only. removes 'simultaneous equation bias but also tends
to eliminate measurement error in the endogenous variables by the use of
instruments in the first stage. As discussed above, it was suspectedthat measurement error might be a problem in the regressions for the
economy as a whole because of the uncertainty about controlling for
variation in the curnent incidence of discrimination across states.
That the TSLS estimates did not differ significantly from the OLS esti-
mates su~gests that the supposed negative bias on the enforcement esti~
mates is not a serious problem.
41 The analysis of nonwhite, rather than black, male wages is necessitated
by the categories of the 1960 Census from which the data are taken. In
1960, more than 90 percent of nonwhites in the United States were black.
42. Since the model is discussed in detail in Landes (1968, pp. -513-515), the
discussion will not be repeated here. See also Beller (1974, pp. 162-166).
43. Enforcement during the latter half of fiscal year 1970 waul' not affect
relative wages in 1969 but would affect relative employment in 1970. As
a result, the enforcement variables used in the wage analysis are not
strictly comparable to those used to analyze employment.
44. The sources of the 1969-1970 data are discussed in detail in Beller (1974,
appendix A); those of the 1949-1950 and 1959-1960 data, in Landes (1966,
appendix A).
45. While the TSLS estimates do not differ significantly from the OLS esti-
mates, a noticeable increas~ in the significance of positive coefficients
relative to that of negative coefficients on the enfo~cement variables is
observed. Since the specification of the wage equations does not include
among the independent variables the initial relative economic position of
blacks, which, it has been argued, reflects variations across states in the
current incidence of discrimination, the relative increase in the signif-
icance of positive coefficients probably arises from the elimination of mea-
surem~t error in the enforcement variables (see note 40). The equati~n used59
in the first stage of the simultaneous equations model postulates the
incidence of enforcement as a function of the change in relative wages,
the presence of, a regional,-officei'of the.$OaCin a state, the demographic
characteristics of the black population used in the relative employment
equations, and the exogenous variables in the model.
46. The specifications of the employment and wage enforcement variables
presented in the tables in this sectio.n are chosen in the same manner
as those in the previous section•.,~~7'he b:~s'of, that~.choic$1tis,demcnikBed
in the previous section (see pa,ge 16 and note 36). ;For the -overall
incidence of enforcement, the more significant of the linear or quadratic
specifications is presented.
47. The mean percentage change in relative wages from 1959 to 1969 was 7.62
percent. This value was 0.8 percentage points lower than it would have
been if the incidence of enforcement had been equal to zero. A 95 per-
cent confiden'ce interval around this value ranged between a reduction
of 2.1 percentage points and an increase of .5 percentage points.
48, While the census does not have data on nonwhite income for some states
in 1949, Landes (1968) has constructed estimates of it for those states.
He shows that the correlation coefficient between relative income and
relative wages in 1959, when data on both were available, is .93. From
this he concludes that "an analysis of income in 1959 (and probably 1949)
would not produce substantially different results from an analysis of
wages. II He points out, however, that "significant disparities could
result with respect to the impact of anyone independent variable. • .on
wages and income" (1968, p. 532, n. 28).
49. The effect of enforcement on relative annual income would be weaker than
that on relative weekly wages if enforcement affected relative weeks.worked
and annual earnings in opposite directions. T8L8 estimates on the percentage60
change in relative weeks worked from regression equations of the form
used throughout this section yielded estimates as follows:
6 -.348 x 10
234 EMCHG2 (1.82) and .410 x 10 WACHG' (2.03). The t-statistics are in
parentheses. Hence, enforcement of the wage and employment provisions
had significant effects On relative weeks worked, effects that were in
the opposite direction from their effects on relative wages. This factor
accounts for the relatively weaker effect of enforcement on annual in-
come than on weekly wages. The effect of enforcement on relative weeks
worked may be explained as follows. Enforcement of the employment
provision increases relative nonwhite employment and wages. Nonwhite
employment will increase by entry into the labor force of nonwhites who
possibly have weaker labor force attachments than'those already in. If
they work fewerwee~s, on the average, than'those nonwhites already in
the labor force, average weeks worked will be redueed. Enforcement of
the wage provision reduces relative nonwhite employment and wages. It is
probable that those nonwhites with the weakest lAbor force attachments
drop out of the labor force entirely. If they have worked fewer weeks per
year than those'remaining in the labor force, average weeks worked will
increase.
50. In an alternative case, utility is specified as a function of profits and
the ratio of blacks to whites employed. This case cannot be handled by
the standard mathematical techniques because it is known that the indif-
ference curves are not convex. Therefore, the first-order conditions do
not guarantee a maximum (see Arrow, 1973).'i
;:;.
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